Thanks!
It started by chatting with Anke 15y ago (!) on how governments may negotiate treaties not because of spillovers, but to tie hands of future governments
=>
(a) coalitions can be larger
(b) we provide a unique theory of "conventions"
(c) the Paris Agreement won't unravel even if US withdraws🙂
It started by chatting with Anke 15y ago (!) on how governments may negotiate treaties not because of spillovers, but to tie hands of future governments
=>
(a) coalitions can be larger
(b) we provide a unique theory of "conventions"
(c) the Paris Agreement won't unravel even if US withdraws🙂
Reposted from
Journal of Public Economics
Paper shows that political incumbents may want to sign treaties that tie the hands of their successors. Thus, by offering commitment, a treaty can exploit domestic time inconsistency problems.
The theory predicts that countries may want to remain in the Paris Agreement even if the US withdraws.
The theory predicts that countries may want to remain in the Paris Agreement even if the US withdraws.
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