Profile avatar
frankkuhn.bsky.social
Doctoral Researcher @PRIF.org | Coordinator @cntrarmscontrol.org | Nuclear Scholar @poni.csis.org | @deepcutsproject.bsky.social | Nuclear Weapons | Arms Control | Nuclear Deterrence | Cold War History | Military Technology and Strategy | Opinions my own
341 posts 1,277 followers 979 following
Regular Contributor
Active Commenter

We can now see the damage from Israeli strikes on the missile bases in Isfahan thanks to the daily 3m images from our friends @planetlabs.bsky.social All the missile checkout buildings were destroyed at the Isfahan north base, likely hampering Iran's ability to generate strikes from there

For what it's worth: @frankkuhn.bsky.social at least had a bit of fun while proofreading my dissertation.🙃

Tbh, in light of the domestic political situation in the US, the permanent infighting between certain factions inside the US government, and the resulting inconsistencies of US policy, positive "internal messaging" from the White House to NATO doesn't really reassure me that much. (1/3)

Some assorted thoughts on the current conflict between Israel and Iran, and how it impacts wider dynamics of modern warfare.

These considerations very much resemble what is in the initial U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations Concept. 🧵 1/

There's obviously a lot new about the Israel-Iran war, but also something quite old-fashioned about how US forces are flowing into theater in a fully publicized and completely uncontested way.

“Rather than continuing to hedge and hope, Europe needs to pay more attention to the administration’s actions versus its rhetoric, and plan for a future with sharply reduced U.S. military support.”

Perhaps worth noting that Israel shoots down a lot of "game-changing" drones while also putting "old school" guided bombs launched from fast jets on target in Iran.

Die Vereinigten Staaten 🇺🇸 haben eine beträchtliche Anzahl an Tankflugzeugen über den Atlantik verlegt. Diese Verlegung soll offensichtlich nicht (!) mit der multinationalen Übung “Atlantic Trident” in Verbindung stehen.

“This mass movement does not appear to be linked to any currently scheduled multinational air exercise such as Atlantic Trident, leading many to assess it as a pre-positioning effort in support of future operations or rapid response plans.”

Russia says it may end the “moratorium” on intermediate-range missiles after Lavrov already said in December 2024 that it will be abandoned. This thing is like Schroedinger’s moratorium.

As I was saying…

ICAN estimates that global nuclear weapon spending in 2024 amounts to $100 billion. However, the actual worldwide expenditure on nuclear weapons is likely even higher, perhaps as high as $150 billion. This is because spending in Russia and China is likely significantly higher. 📈 Here is why. 🧵 1/

Israel's strategy appears to include creating enough of a mess that the US is entangled and finishes its job for it (notably, by taking out Fordow). This would be a mistake of the highest order.

Das ist im Übrigen auch einer der Gründe, warum eine "Entspannungspolitik" mit Russland - mal angenommen, wir würden in einer Welt leben, in der die russische Seite genuin daran interessiert wäre - nur sehr wenig Aussichten auf Erfolg hätte. (1/3)

*Job Alert für Studierende*: Für das Berliner Büro des @prif.org suchen wir eine studentische Hilfskraft. Bitte sehr gerne weiterverbreiten: www.prif.org/karriere/ste...

Waiting for more reactions from #Russia to #Israel attack on #Iran. But what seems highly likely - in continuation of the trend of the past year - is that there is little #Russia can or is willing to do for Iran. 🧵

An dieser Stelle sei auch auf das PRIF Spotlight meines Kollegen Thorsten Gromes zum Thema „Konfliktmythen“ verwiesen.

“The 56th [Artillery Command] is expected to become the Army’s first permanent multi-domain command in Europe, the 56th Multi-Domain Command Europe, combining traditional long-range fires with capabilities in space, cyberspace, land, air, and maritime domains⁠.” www.army.mil/article/2862...

'To reach even [Natanz] all the weapons available to the Israeli Air Force, and all except the 30,000 lbs GBU-57/B and the 5,000 lbs GBU 72/B available to the United States, would likely require several impacts into the same crater to ‘burrow’ down...' www.rusi.org/explore-our-...

2022 wurde es sichtbar & jetzt nochmal anders: Die Linke hat sich sehr lange nicht mehr mit dem Militär beschäftigt – weder akademisch noch politisch oder gar lebensweltlich – & it shows. Man zehrt oft noch sehr von überlieferter Politfolklore vergangener Generationen.

Wenn wir um Aufwuchsfähigkeit der #Bundeswehr und eine größere Truppe reden, sollten wir nicht nur über Quantität, sondern auch Qualität sprechen. Ein bisschen Wochenendausbildung hat nichts mit #Kriegstauglichkeit zu tun - ein Gastbeitrag⬇️ www.zeit.de/politik/deut...

Since New START counting rules count one bomber as just one warhead, regardless of the actual number of warheads doployed, the U.S. Air Force could already add more warheads to its bomber force now if ordered to do so.