As so often is the case, there appears to be less to this than immediately meets the eye. What seems to have been agreed is the two sticking points in the normalization agreement that have been the focus of recent negotiations.
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These concern the presence of third-party forces along the Arm-Az border, i.e. the EU Mission in Armenia, and the legal cases at the ICJ & other international courts. It seems that Armenia has agreed to the withdrawal of both EUMA, perhaps after its current mandate ends, and the court cases.
Azerbaijan continues to insist on revision of Armenia’s Constitution, although it seems possibly ‘in the next phase’ per AZ FM J. Bayramov, and on the formal dissolution of the Minsk Group: two already known and expected preconditions.
But a referendum on constitutional change in Armenia won’t happen before 2026 and brings its own risks, especially if seen to be happening at Azerbaijan's behest (Armenian PM N. Pashinyan has been introducing an alternative rationale, but that's for another thread).
Long-term observers of the process are sceptical. The most contentious issue, connectivity & corridors, is not included in the agreement. Another issue, highlighted by @olesyavart.bsky.social, is whether this announcement is enough to kick-start the moribund Turkish-Armenian normalization process.
Meanwhile war propaganda continues in Azerbaijan, alleging Armenian plans for a springtime attack, as well as the retro-irredentism of the ‘Western Azerbaijan’ discourse laying claim to the whole of Armenia.
The extent to which such propaganda and the ‘Western Azerbaijan’ discourse subsides in the event of a treaty signature would be a seminal test of that document’s prospects. No sign of that whatsoever yet.
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