Yes but there you’re regulating based on the causal relationship with killing not the context of the opinion expressed. I’m not saying you can’t or shouldn’t regulate based on opinion/expression just that it’s perfectly cogent to have that as a line. - ThreadSky

michaelpforan.bsky.social • 100 days ago

Yes but there you’re regulating based on the causal relationship with killing not the context of the opinion expressed. I’m not saying you can’t or shouldn’t regulate based on opinion/expression just that it’s perfectly cogent to have that as a line.

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spinninghugo.bsky.social•100 days ago

I'm not sure that works. Can;t we say that is true of all action? Movements of human bodies themselves are never alone objectionable, it is the adverse possibe results for others they may result in that we're worried about.

michaelpforan.bsky.social•100 days ago

I think we can distinguish between acts which are regulated in themselves and acts that are regulated only when they produce consequences or are sufficiently likely to do so. We don’t need a general theory of regulating action; we can have a different theory of each of these categories for example

spinninghugo.bsky.social•100 days ago

Do we ever regulate acts for themselves? I can see that we regulate acts that, as things turn out, don't have any consequences (eg attempted murder) but do we ever regulate acts for themselves regardless of how they might effect others? What would you have in mind?

michaelpforan.bsky.social•100 days ago

The effect on another can be a part of the act itself. Killing is an act that involves an effect on another and the act of killing is itself what is regulated regardless of what consequences it produces. I’d say the default is that we don’t regulate purely based on consequences.

spinninghugo.bsky.social•100 days ago

Unsure, I am no philosopher of action.

Whilst we do regulate actions that could have had consequences for others but did not (eg attempted murder) we don't (now?) regulate actions themselves without more ado, we regulate because of their actual or possible consequences for others.

michaelpforan.bsky.social•100 days ago

For example, we prohibit torture regardless of whether the act of torture produces good or bad consequence overall. Any good consequences can’t override the fact that the act of torture is itself what is prohibited. It’s deontic in nature.

matthewmorris.bsky.social•100 days ago

There’s a school of thought (eg Parfit) that *rule* consequentialism can generally be usefully applied to argue against things like torture: e.g. can still invoke outcomes, just not in an *act* consequentialist fashion. And practically, there are exceptions even so: we tortured German spies in WW2.

michaelpforan.bsky.social•100 days ago

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