The argument from will not q to cannot q is a form of logical fatalism. Hasker and a few others still defend that argument. I think it confuses these two propositions: (1) necessarily I will not actually q, and (2) necessarily I will not q. (1) follows from the fact that I will not q, (2) doesn’t.
Yeah, I’m not with Hasker (at least I don’t think I am). I wont take my shirt off during a lecture, it doesn’t follow that what I will do during lecture is settled. On the version I endorse, the OFT is about actions and not about omissions. To do A, it mustn’t be settled prior to deciding to do A.
There I think we disagree. My wife knows that I will not eat spam for breakfast. That means the actual future includes no spam. But many, many possible futures include me eating spam. I can for sure eat spam tomorrow. But I for sure won’t.
That’s compatible with my view as well, I think. Even though your wife knows you won’t eat spam, she doesn’t know what you will eat. She can’t know that given that you are the one that settles what you will eat.
She knows that p only if p. But if p, then (I think on your view) I cannot bring about ~p. She knows that I will not eat spam only if I can’t. But, my objection goes, I can bring about ~p. What I can’t bring about is actually ~p. But that doesn’t affect my freedom.
Im not sure. I hv to think more about this. My initial response is to say that truth values of future propos related to human actions are neither true or false on my view given my beliefs in agent causation.
So, I want to say that you can bring about p or ~p at t iff p isn’t settled prior to t
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So, I want to say that you can bring about p or ~p at t iff p isn’t settled prior to t