I'm thinking more of analog implementations. I can say I don't do a sum over probabilities when I type, but I can't say I don't have stuff flowing around my brain.
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Right, but at that point you're at a kind of Searlean naturalism where the physical substrata of mental processes is required for those processes, and these can't be reduced to logic systems that Turing machines exclusively work with.
I don't follow. I don't mean that the analog implementation is required, only that it shows I cannot rule out that I am performing a certain computation by showing a program for it which is unfamiliar to my experience.
Landgrebe and Smith, building on Searle, would prolly argue that the physical processes which underlie our thinking aren't computations at all, but emanations from complex systems that are resistant to modeling via the logic systems which computers exclusively operate with.
Skimming the paper they have online, it seems like they work with Searle in terms of speech acts, which seems fine, but I don't see the connection to the screenshot.
I associate Searle on microphysical computation with his claim about random particle systems implementing Wordstar in Rediscovery of Mind, which he fails to show and walks back immediately.
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