Why hasn’t tritium control been at least part of the conversation of disarmament and arms control (not just an academic subject)? (Bonus: who needs convincing?) What scenarios if any would make tritium control/verification a useful complement to fissile material control/verification? - ThreadSky

tayloraloy.bsky.social • 3 days ago

Why hasn’t tritium control been at least part of the conversation of disarmament and arms control (not just an academic subject)? (Bonus: who needs convincing?)

What scenarios if any would make tritium control/verification a useful complement to fissile material control/verification?

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midlifesuezcrisis.bsky.social•3 days ago

Hmm, if anyone else asked me this question I'd turn to your diss...I think the clearest answer is that you don't strictly need tritium to make a bomb. Fissiles are the weak link. I also think it's easier to hide the amount of T production needed to be weapon-useful.

midlifesuezcrisis.bsky.social•3 days ago

I would think it's also easier to hide T diversion. It's usually clear as day when someone is breeding WGPu in a LWR; conversely there's a bit T just hiding in SNF if you really wanted to go for it, and I think you could hide TPBARs in fuel assemblies in a way that would defy easy IAEA inspection.

tayloraloy.bsky.social•3 days ago

I agree with this. And @peacescience.bsky.social makes the TPBAR point in his book.

I keep coming back to the time dimension. Tritium is more of a vertical proliferation risk, but once incorporated it’s in an ongoing material demand. Larger stockpiles (US, Russia, China?) have bigger T footprints

tayloraloy.bsky.social•3 days ago

France is presumably on cruise control due to their stockpile downsizing in the 90s. They aren’t in a hurry but they also can’t ignore it. Other smaller arsenals (Israel, India, Pakistan, DPRK) can eek by as you say. But there’s a key role in NWS arms control that hasn’t been fully explored.

tayloraloy.bsky.social•3 days ago

Some of this sentiment is rooted in Kalinowski’s highly technical and sober analysis, and some of it is admittedly just “vibes” that motivates me to stick with it as a potential nonpro lever we haven’t tried pulling yet.

And thanks for the diss nod!

midlifesuezcrisis.bsky.social•3 days ago

Ah, yeah this is an avenue I don't think about as much (vertical proliferation). I think you'd run into headaches where the major powers don't want controls or oversight on their defense tritium, because the amount of T you go thru in a year might imply things about exact arsenal size and/or...

midlifesuezcrisis.bsky.social•3 days ago

... T bottle replacement frequency, and you could make inferences about weapon reliability from that.

gbruhaug.bsky.social•3 days ago

The French are restarting T production this year apparently. Not a shocker given half lives, plus they will supposedly start doing DT at LMJ soon enough. https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/nuclear-weapons-france-to-restart-tritium-production-with-edf/

tayloraloy.bsky.social•3 days ago

I’ve taken a provocative cue from that in my latest piece:

gbruhaug.bsky.social•3 days ago

How would you track this in nations like China or India that run PHWRs? The amount of potential tritium at their finger tips, without any lithium rods, is large and basically impossible to track given their current weapons state status as is.

tayloraloy.bsky.social•3 days ago

This is a good question. Incidental T production in HW moderators is largely a function of power levels. Unless these reactors are modified to produce more than incidental levels, then they should be predictable based on power history.

Also, I don’t think China has a TRF yet, like Canada and ROK.

tayloraloy.bsky.social•3 days ago

So, they may just be storing the tritiated moderator until they get a facility to separate it at an industrial levels like Romania is planning.

alexmames.bsky.social•3 days ago

There’s a fun parallel question about what tritium control (and fast neutron flux control?) looks like in a hypothetical commercial fusion reactor with a breeder blanket. I haven’t heard of any engagement on a control regime from any of the fusion startups, though I suppose they have bigger problems

tayloraloy.bsky.social•3 days ago

It looks like @robgoldston.bsky.social snuck in the door when I wasn’t looking.

He’s been on fusion safeguards for a while.

We’re also planning on a chapter on the topic for our @carnegiecorp.bsky.social civilian/military nuclear divide edited volume.

midlifesuezcrisis.bsky.social•3 days ago

Yeah, this is a "fun" one. Fusion reactor walls are going to be crazy hot from activation and maybe that creates intrinsic safeguards, but I don't know if anyone is thinking seriously here yet.

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