Thank you very much for your fast reply.
Wouldn‘t the device now have to encrypt the keys with a new RSA 2048 key? Because the „old“ private key still resides securely in the now defunct HSMs?
Yes. The idea is that the private key can never ever leave the device, not even for “authorized” replication. If it could, then Apple could be coerced to extract it.
Of course the new threat vector is that you can spin up a new fake cluster and have the device upload to it.
The real problem here is that Apple is both the potential threat actor and also the trust anchor for the system. They build the devices but could also be compelled to exploit them. It’s a very dangerous game.
Ah ok, so the next time your device asks for your passcode (iCSC) it’s either an upgrade of the infrastructure or an extremely sophisticated attack with no way of knowing which one it is?
Yeah. And it asks for your passcode once per day anyway so honestly if Apple becomes malicious you’re in trouble. A lot of human integrity standing in for technical defenses.
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Wouldn‘t the device now have to encrypt the keys with a new RSA 2048 key? Because the „old“ private key still resides securely in the now defunct HSMs?
Of course the new threat vector is that you can spin up a new fake cluster and have the device upload to it.