The Cosmic Lottery & Fine Tuning: Debunking the This Universe Objection
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Proponents of the theistic fine tuning argument & opponents of the multiverse (MV) hypothesis argue that, while the MV might explain why some universe is fine tuned, it doesn't explain why ⬇️
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Proponents of the theistic fine tuning argument & opponents of the multiverse (MV) hypothesis argue that, while the MV might explain why some universe is fine tuned, it doesn't explain why ⬇️
Comments
The argument goes thus: under naturalism, the probability of (any) universe having constants with the life permitting values is vanishingly small. A life permitting universe is more likely under a theistic hypothesis than under a naturalistic one. Therefore ⬇️
This judgement of epistemic improbability is arrived at by considering the range of possible values (we believe) the constants could have taken*, and considering how many of those would be in the life ⬇️
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The Multiverse Objection
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Proponents of the multiverse hypothesis argue that, in a suitably vast multiverse, comprising universes which realise the entire ⬇️
To which opponents of the multiverse hypothesis object that, while the multiverse explains how some universe would be fine tuned, it doesn't explain why this universe has the life ⬇️
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The Cosmic Lottery
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To see why this objection fails, we can imagine a cosmic lottery in which the sample space (of possible universes) is represented by a drum containing universes, each with a different set of values for the constants - one of ⬇️
In this cosmic lottery, the universe which corresponds to this one, is one among a huge number. Hence, in a lottery where only one ball or universe is chosen (from the sample space), the odds of this universe being chosen and actualised, is ⬇️