jccust.bsky.social
Júlio Custódio
Science Fiction enthusiast <3
Professor of Philosophy (Phd in philosophy of logic),
writer, and sometimes i play piano.
103 posts
547 followers
2,732 following
Active Commenter
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The sun seems to move in the sky, and the Earth seems stationary
Many wrong things seem right, and many right things seem wrong
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Yes! Well, sometimes the research takes days/weeks, and I have to keep the tabs 🙃.
Not a great strategy, though, because sometimes the browser crashes precisely due to the tabs, and I lose the links…
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Sometimes I do it for research. I usually search for a theme, open lots of tabs about it, and then go reading. Also, when I have to check and recheck information from various sources, I find it very useful!
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There is also a lot of pseudoscience in scientific fields too, so imagine bad philosophy.
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I think the process approach is more compatible with contemporary biology. For consciousness, I like the Global Workspace Theory (GWT), where consciousness is a dynamic hub of information available for other biological systems.
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And, as you said, it is a valid label; I'm not name-calling nor misrepresenting their positions, I'm only making it evident.
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I agree it is polemical but the importance of this term is that it shows a quiet problem in philosophy today, which is: very often philosophy advocates for anti-scientific approaches and doesn't seem to see it as the same as advocating for pseudosciences like astrology, homeopathy, psychoanalysis...
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👍
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Again, I’m talking about theories, as the post was about the claim that physicalism is dead/dying in psychology and philosophy of mind. So, if your theory about how it is possible to have a first-person experience (tasting an apple) appeals to non-physical realms, you are engaging in pseudoscience.
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Not to mention that, scientifically speaking, the most unreliable strategy you could use to justify a claim is via introspection. I really dont think that the unscientific approaches to philosophy of mind are trying to understand consciousness; they are just trying to justify common myths about it.
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I agree. People often use the first-person experience as if it proves some limit of science, but they usually understand it uncritically. It’s very hard for most people outside neuroscience to accept that consciousness might be just an illusory theater created by the body for evolutionary reasons.
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Amazing
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I don’t doubt that
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I completely agree with this. Maybe the fact that this is not voiced as clearly and as often as it should means that, in fact, it could (or will) get ugly
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Although I agree with your comment, I did not compare phil of mind to astrology. I said that some proposals/approaches in phil of mind are clearly unscientific, and this could lead it to the epistemological fate of astrology. But of course some approaches in phil of mind are scientific!
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Ok. I was talking about claims and theories!
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Nonetheless, if this 'approach from awareness' makes claims that are not empirically verifiable (in the sense that they are not shareable) or is dependent on some non-physical conception, I cannot see how it is not unscientific. It all depends on how you justify the claims (through science or not).
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Obviously I'm talking about theories and not about "any activity" (I don't know where you got that from). Theories about humans and/or any aspect of reality are either scientific or non-scientific. Non-scientific approaches are unscientific and, therefore, pseudoscience. Silly is not getting this!
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See, you cannot say that you are advocating for an approach that is different from the scientific approach and, at the same time, claim that you are not being unscientific (or engaging in pseudoscience).
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Well, reading your last messages, it certainly seemed like you claimed exactly this. But okay.
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Well, in fact, science has already ruled out non-physical approaches (i.e., not dependent on the consequences of the fundamental physical interactions). You are free to disagree with science, but that's the scientific view today, and this means that contrary views are unscientific/pseudoscience.
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See, the very claim that we need more than the fundamental physical interactions is, today, unscientific and, therefore, pseudoscience.
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As i said many times here: 'physical' in the scientific sense usually means what is in the scope of the consequences of the fundamental physical interactions (the 2 quantum forces, electromagnetism and gravity).
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Now it seems you are conflating what is not yet scientifically known (or even researchable) with what today's science has already ruled out. Substance dualism, idealism, or any non-physical approaches are already ruled out from today's scientific view (it's not just 'we don't know yet').
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I really don't know what you are arguing here. My whole point in this thread is simply that non-physical approaches to the questions in the philosophy of mind are not scientific (or, they are pseudoscience). Of course, any other non-observable or non-sharable approaches are not scientific either.
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If this distinction amounts to some form of substance dualism or idealism (if it is not still just physicalism), it is incongruent with the scientific view, because the scientific view is physicalism all the way up.
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Yep, because the claim that science has 'value' or is 'political' — which is correct — is often used to discredit science as a biased or subjective opinion: THIS is also a huge social problem. Therefore, the claim that science has 'value' or is 'political' cannot be defended uncritically.
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And again, it seems that you are ignoring a whole body of empirical research (from neuroscience, psychology, biology, and even AI) that is ALREADY addressing the 'awareness' issue.
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See, it seems you are denying or ignoring that science is already addressing the 'awareness' problem. If you are making unscientific claims about awareness, you are in the realm of pseudoscience. I'm not 'name-calling' or insulting; I'm just pointing out the incongruence.
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There are two different problems. Of course, science as a human and social activity is full of 'value,' but this does not mean that science is merely a biased or subjective opinion. Unfortunately, the claim that science has 'value' is often used to discredit science, which is a huge social problem.
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And I'm not setting up a conflict between philosophy and science; my conflict is between philosophy and pseudoscience ;p
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I find it hard to say that flat-earth positions are not pseudoscience, and I don't know how this is different in the cognitive field. The problem is that some philosophers tend to give themselves the right to claim completely unscientific theories but don't want to be labeled pseudoscientists.
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And I'm not setting up a conflict between philosophy and science; my conflict is between philosophy and pseudoscience ;p
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I find it hard to say that flat-earth positions are not pseudoscience, and I don't know how this is different in the cognitive field. The problem is that some philosophers tend to give themselves the right to claim completely unscientific theories but don't want to be labeled pseudoscientists.
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As I said, no one is denying first-person experience (or qualities or qualia); please re-read the thread. I'm just saying that, from a scientific point of view, these are all dependent on the physical (meaning: within the scope of the consequences of fundamental physical interactions).
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If people are assuming positions and claims that are not compatible with contemporary science (in this case, cognitive neuroscience, for example), then they cannot complain about being accused of pseudoscience. They should embrace it, as some do.
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I agree. Neuroscientists are doing science and Chalmers is doing pseudoscience ;)
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And thats why Chalmers is not taken very seriously in cognitive neuroscience ;)
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It really seems like you are just using these supposed two meanings of ‘physical’ to hide your substance dualism position. If that’s the case, you are engaging in pseudoscience, because from a scientific point of view, substance dualism has already been ruled out.
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I completely agree. In my opinion, philosophy of mind should have already embraced or, better yet, merged with cognitive sciences. The non-scientific part of it is obviously just pseudoscience and has as much epistemological value as astrology or flat-earth ideas
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Most cognitive scientists don’t see consciousness as that fundamental. It is just another evolutionary adaptive function/ process/ attribute that provided some advantages for the organism
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If ‘physical’ means within the range of fundamental physical interactions, then it is not, a priori, pseudoscience. Take notice though that consciousness can be understood very differently. In cognitive sciences the tendency is that it is just a contextualization hub of information for the organism.
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I don’t know what you are supposed to be arguing here. Again, I’m not denying first-person analysis (systematic or not), I’m just saying that non-physical approaches to that are steering philosophy of mind in the direction of pseudoscience. But, of course, you are free to do it ;)
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If you are using qualities to argue for non-physicalism, you first have to prove that physicalism cannot address the issue of qualities. However, take notice that neuroscience is already addressing this, so you would have to engage with or refute (or ignore) contemporary cognitive sciences.
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Again, ‘physical’ here means only that it falls within the range of fundamental physical interactions; this is the ontological realm of science. If one is presupposing another ontological substance for issues in philosophy of mind, then one is engaging in pseudoscience (or religion, mysticism…
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However, I think you just proved my point. The position that relies on non-physical explanations in philosophy of mind is not scientific and is better understood as a religion or mystical tradition/dogma. In this sense, it is epistemologically akin to astrology or pseudosciences.