johanneskleiner.bsky.social
Physicist and mathematician working on consciousness. Based at Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Graduate School of Systemic Neurosciences, and University of Bamberg's Institute for Psychology. https://jkleiner.de/
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Don't know them so far I fear ...
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The implicit characterizations that François mentions?
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Interesting! I was thinking that by getting rid of problematic properties of PC one is also getting rid of the hard problem, no need to get rid of PC itself. Is this so? Would help me to make sense of some of @keithfrankish.bsky.social's points, e.g. that there still is feeling of pain.
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I think it's sometimes hard to appreciate the relevance of metaphysical distinctions from a purely scientific perspective. This is why I'm super curious if illusionism also singles out a type of theory of consciousness:
bsky.app/profile/joha...
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... not have means to decide between different ERS (different axioms), so perhaps we only need to expand RTM by such means to distinguish between the tasks, and to find out which is more apt. For phenomenal consciousness, this is a question about its structure.
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Sorry that example was too short. What I mean is the following: (Apologies if this is clear already.)
In Representational Measurement Theory, the difference between detection and discrimination measurement is a difference in Empirical Relational Structures (aka axioms) that are presumed. RTM does...
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... Perhaps just a small modification necessary to apply to consciousness?)
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Agreed! My hope would be that a substantive measurement theory, perhaps based on structural representations of phenomenal consciousness, could help arbitrate such questions. (RTM is super strong on this end already-- detection and discrimination correspond to different ERS. ...
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Also good 😉😅
#consci
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I was thinking along different lines: We get the structure of the explanandum of tocs by psychophysics or psychometrics-style experiments. For such experiments, I was thinking, metaphysics shouldn't make a difference. We just measure structure operationally, so to speak.
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Finally finished the paper. 😊 Congrats again!
Returning to my question above: In the paper you only mention Eric's def and what you call D and E. Are there others you would endorse?
(Not trying to object, just to learn 😉 - as much depends on this in general!)
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Nice!
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Would love it if there were more things like this! May I ask what you do in the group process?
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Yes! Though my hunch was that while the metaphysics differ, the structure of the scientific representation of the explanandum used in a theory is the same. E.g. while the illusion doesn't involve pp, it involves some mother properties that instantiate the same structure as pps. Could this be?
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My impression is that almost all theories of C target the same phenomenon. They differ in which aspect of the phenomenon they seek to explain, and in how they describe or represent that aspect in the theory, but fundamentally aim for the same phenomenon. Is this in agreement with your point?
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...structure that represents a different explanatory strategy (that of explaining illusions)? If yes, do you have a pointer or example of what this structure might be, e.g. in other disciplines? (Trying to understand what the difference to realist theories would be as far as formalism is concerned.)
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Thanks! I've been curious for a while about what this 👇 statement would mean in terms of a formal theory of consciousness. Is it correct to think that there would still be an explanandum variable/structure corresponding to a meaningful p.c. concept, but the theory would have a different formal ...
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Looks amazing! 👏
So you're endorsing the possibility of a concept of phenomenal consciousness that is devoid of problematic commitments?
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Thank you! Childcare is great! I'll try with the grandparents first, but in case they can't, I might just bring the little one. Wonderful idea/initiative! 😊
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The biggest cliffhanger ever 😉
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Dear @ademertzi.bsky.social, may I ask, while the programme is still under construction, if the tutorials will take place on July 6? Or is July 6 already a full day of the conference? (Trying to organize childcare.) Thank you and best wishes! 🙏😊
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Being in the overflow lecture hall back then I never found out how the sentence concluded. The video just cut out. If anyone knows, let me know 😉
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The best part of that video is its last 20 seconds 😉
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📌
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Congratulations!! 👏
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Congratulations!!! 😊👏
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Just did. Thank you!
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Any chance you could CC me too? :-)
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📌
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Great videos!!
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👏👏👏 Congratulations again!! 😊
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📌
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www.golem.de/news/buerokr...
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Congratulations!!! 👏👏👏
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👍 Added!
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I heard MoC6 might be in Japan the week before 😉😊😅 #consci
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illumination conditions [49]. Thus, activity patterns in the retina and V1 cannot explain colour perception because there is no constant mapping between states in these areas and individual colour percepts".
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I think "consistent" is a bit too broad. For example: "the encoding of chromatic signals in the retina and in V1 does not match the subject’s conscious colour perception that exhibits colour constancy across different ...
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CC @ronyhirsch.bsky.social @torgedellert.bsky.social @passler.bsky.social