ph-jaeg.bsky.social
Policy Fellow @DelorsBerlin, covering EU econ & climate policy || previously at EU Commission, working on Germany's recovery || Econ at LSE
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On the third column @gzachmann.bsky.social : it shows how much a company would pay per MWh after the subsidy on its *total* electricity consumption. Given that the subsidy can only be paid on 50% of a company's elec consumption, considering also the non-subsidized 50%, the subsidy shrinks by half
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Thanks! Indeed, the 10% additional subsidy are not in the chart (should be added later). Seems a bit of a random addition to the criteria - and further complicates the scheme... not clear to me why this was introduced in this way.
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here the link to CISAF: competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/about/contri..., and to the Handelsblatt article (which was nice enough to include my assessment). www.handelsblatt.com/politik/inte...
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and if you are in Berlin next Thursday, come discuss these findings with us at our EU to go: www.delorscentre.eu/de/veranstal...
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here the paper: www.delorscentre.eu/en/publicati...
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🏁
An ambitious implementation of the CID is essential for EU competitiveness, sovereignty and climate objectives.
The good news: the EU can still get this right. But for this, CID implementation must match the scale and urgency of the challenges faced by EU clean industries (18/18)
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The Commission should also be more explicit about the limits of industrial policies. For instance, the 40% domestic manufacturing objective set out in the NZIA is
neither realistic nor desirable for solar PV anymore - let's be clearer about this. More examples in the paper. (17/n)
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4️⃣Being explicit about what EU industrial policies can realistically deliver
This requires, first, that COM provide more clarity on who does what - EU-level, member states, and the private sector. Hydrogen subsidies are a good example (explained in the paper) for why this needs improvement. (16/n)
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3️⃣ Increasing speed of implementation
Doing industrial policy is complicated, and rushing it has risks – but so too does being slow.
One example: The first EU lead market strategy is from 2008 (!). We can't wait untill 2030 for the public procurement revision to be implemented to get them. (15/n)
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2️⃣Widening the coverage of sector-specific policies to additional key industries
For key industries, COM should develop additional sector-specific strategies - e.g. for batteries and wind, as well as for energy-intensive industries such as paper and cement etc (i.e. NACE 17 & 23). (14/n)
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1️⃣Implementing proposed instruments forcefully.
As the CID remains vague, it will be crucial that the EU is bold when deciding the specifics of its industrial policy tools. In the paper, I illustrate this with lead markets, state aid rules (opex subsidies!) and EV purchasing schemes. (13/n)
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So, what's needed to ensure the CID is actually turned into hard-edged policy? The brief gives four recommendations (12/n)
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One exception to this, and a promising tool, is lead markets. But their scope remains unspecified so far, to be spelt out in the IDAA. To make a noticable difference, lead markets must go beyond what the NZIA has done for clean tech - but the action plan says NZIA will be the model. (11/n)
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But both action plans are rehashing, for the most part, policy measures that were already on the EU agenda before (like expanding renewables quickly) - and unless they are implemented with much more vigor than before, it's doubtful they will now bring about a sea change (10/n)
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On energy-intensive industries, the CID again provides sharp analysis on high energy prices, challenging international markets, and decarbonisation costs. In March, two action plans, for metals&steel, and affordable energy, were published. (9/n)
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That means many strategic questions for clean tech still remain unanswered. The extent to which clean tech will be covered in upcoming legislation, like the IDAA, also is open. Overall, it's unclear which EU policy is supposed to help turn the tide for clean tech (8/n)
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Beyond the transport value chain, there are no sector-specific strategies for clean tech; nothing to tackle the sector-specific bottlenecks for wind turbines, heat pumps, or electrolyzers, for instance. (7/n)
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On clean tech, the CID only offers an action plan for automotives. Like the CID, it's a decent strategy, but does not commit the EU to game changing measures yet - i.e. level of actual ambition is still an open question. (6/n)
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The CID implementation needs to be very bold, given the massive challenges of the sectors.
On clean tech, Chinese products are often MUCH cheaper. And EU-based producers continue to lose market share in the EU and globally. The chart shows the recent developments (higher quality in PDF): (5/n)
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As a result, the success of the CID hinges on how the many blanks for instruments like lead markets are filled in in COM proposals, and then by co-legislators, over the next 1-2 years.
The chart shows how previous EU sectoral policy relates to the CID, and what legislation to expect: (4/n)
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As a strategy paper, it is a leap forward for the EU: unlike the 2023 Green Deal Industrial Plan, the CID has a sharp problem analysis and identifies the right levers to tackle the sectors' problems. But being a high-level strategy, it lacks specifics regarding scope & heft of instruments. (3/n)
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The Clean Industrial Deal (CID) aims to make EU clean tech manufacturing (batteries, wind turbines etc) and energy-intensive industries (steel, chemicals etc) internationally competitive, while cutting emissions. It threads the needle on competitiveness & sticking to climate targets (2/n)
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Und moderne Industriepolitik vermeidet das (zu Recht kritisierte) 'winner picking', und setzt auf marktbasierte Ansätze wie Auktionen oder Leitmärkte. Über deren Ausgestaltung braucht es Debatten, nicht über Maßnahmen die eh niemand mehr vorschlägt (2/2).
www.handelsblatt.com/meinung/kolu...
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@maurerchr.christophmaurer.de assesses the ENTSO-E review in @redispatch.bsky.social , and also wonders about the almost unanimous rejection of it by DE policy circles - worthwhile listen! www.redispatch-podcast.de/e/98-redispa.... Do you think the incentive for DE TSOs above is part of the issue?
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source (in German) about Spahn's stance on industrial policy: background.tagesspiegel.de/energie-und-...
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Yes, Germany has given itself fiscal space with the 500bn Sondervermögen, including for climate transformation via the KTF fund. But how that money will be spent is mostly undecided, and it might not correspond with the Draghi analysis - which Brussels has taken as the strategy for the next years.