samagreene.bsky.social
Professor of Russian Politics, King's College London.
Director of Democratic Resilience, CEPA.
Political sociologist. Progressive. Co-author, Putin v the People. š¬š§/šŗšø
330 posts
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www.heritage.org/sites/defaul...
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I never knew that! So, youāre saying all Hungarians are āmagsplainersā?
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And a bit more in text: tldrussia.substack.com/p/tldrussia-...
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Plus earlier thoughts from Times Radio youtu.be/69njbdAV3hw
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Link here: on.ft.com/4ki1ZMv
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I agree with all of that. I just don't see why that means we should entirely ignore what the US is doing--and thus why threads like mine are a waste of effort. US power doesn't cease to exist just because the administration can't figure out how to wield it effectively.
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As one of the authors of those threads, I (obviously) disagree. Can this create a lasting outcome? Of course not. Can it create increased insecurity en route to ultimate failure? Absolutely. Thereās a difference between āthis wonāt lead where Trump wantsā and āthis will need nowhere.ā
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Long story short: Washington and Moscow can impose a ceasefire on Ukraine on unfavorable terms, and it's looking increasingly likely that they will. Kyiv doesn't have the power to alter those terms -- but Europe does.
/END
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And the EU's sanctions envoy on, well, sanctions: cepa.org/article/euro...
/20
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And the Polish foreign minister on defending Ukraine against Russian missiles:
www.bbc.co.uk/news/article...
/19
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And Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Kosenko on sovereign assets: www.theguardian.com/business/202...
/18
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And don't just take my word for it. Here's Eric Ciaramella and Eric Green on how Europe can move independently on Ukrainian security: www.cfr.org/report/ukrai...
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And finally, Europe can impose costs on the US for recognizing Russian control of Ukrainian territory, including sanctions on corporations and individuals who profit from stolen property -- if it chooses.
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Second, Europe can hold the line on core sanctions, especially assets, financial flows (SWIFT), and energy, while extending compliance requirements to US corporations that do business with Russia -- if it chooses.
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First and foremost, Europe can refuse to sign up to or abide by a deal that leaves Ukraine insecure and can work directly with Ukraine to build security against the wishes of Moscow and Washington -- if it chooses.
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If the deal outlined in the FT is indeed what emerges, Europe will need to exercise its power in relation to the three missing pieces: Security, sanctions, and non-recognition.
/13
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Plus, end Nordstream once and for all, cement the pivot away from Russian gas, complete interconnectors to protect Ukraine and Moldova, and end the loopholes for Hungary, Slovakia and others.
So yes, Europe has power.
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The Commission can and should push the pace on EU enlargement, even if NATO is off the table -- again, daring Russia to do something about it.
And it can deprioritize servicing US foreign policy priorities if Washington persists in ignoring European concerns.
/11
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Europe has leverage, though, if it chooses to use it. It can announce a no-fly zone over much, if not all, of Ukraine quickly, policed initially from the outside, and dare Russia to test it.
It can also seize the Russian sovereign assets, which are mostly in EU acc'ts.
/10
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In other words, a European force must go in before a ceasefire or at the moment of its inception, but if the ceasefire comes first, an assurance force will almost certainly not follow.
For Europe, then, it's now or never.
/9
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Once the fighting stops, the European public discussion will pivot--with a lot of help from Moscow and its friends--to ensuring that it doesn't start again. And Moscow will make it clear that any European assurance force would lead to renewed war.
/8
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Putin will also use Trump's haste to make Ukraine and Europe look like bad-faith actors, if they hesitate to sign on. European leaders may justify their acquiescence by believing that they can get a force on the ground later -- but they're almost certainly wrong.
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Putin is thus accepting Trump's pace precisely because he knows that Europe cannot: While Europe is serious about guaranteeing Ukrainian security, it is not ready. Putin knows that. And so he uses Trump's timetable to force a deal that Europe otherwise wouldn't accept.
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This is a war for dominion, and dominion can be achieved in other ways. Putin can thus use this offer to create permanent insecurity for and political control over Kyiv--but only if two conditions are met:
š„ No European force -> no deterrence
š„ No deterrence -> no EU
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The first question is, is Putin serious?
I think he probably is. He understands he cannot (for now) gain full military control of Ru-claimed territories or Ukraine as a whole. But that is not and never has been his aim.
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Not reported are any details on:
1ā£ Security guarantees (including a European force)
2ā£ Sanctions relief
3ā£ Western positions on the territories
On all three, no news ain't good news.
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Per reporting from the @financialtimes.com, Putin is "offering" to halt the war at the current line of control (minus the piece of Kursk obl. still controlled by Ukraine). Conditions appear to be recognition of Crimea and other Ru-occupied territories, plus no NATO.
www.ft.com/content/5d84...
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Europe, then, needs to do more than find ways to keep supporting Ukraine in the absence of (or against resistance from) the US. Europe may want to find ways to impose its own costs on Washington for walking away.
/END (for now)
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This question, though, isnāt entirely up to Trump. If Putin makes it clear that he wonāt normalize with the US without a deal on Ukraine, things could get sticky.
And Putin *will* pursue a deal if he thinks it will fatally undermine Europeās ability to support Ukraine.
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If the White House remains committed to the normalization agenda, we can expect sanctions rollback, reduced support for Kyiv, and distancing from European powers that continue to support Ukraine.
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It has been clear for a couple of months now that Trump was pursuing āpeaceā as a means to normalize relations with Russia, rather than normalization as a route to peace. As a result, walking away from peace doesnāt inherently imply walking away from normalization.
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Most of the focus in the discussion out there now is whether the US will maintain intelligence support for Ukraine and possibly restart arms deliveries. Sanctions are also a hot-button question. But those are secondary to the normalization question.
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