shashj.bsky.social
Defence Editor at The Economist.
Visiting Fellow at Department of War Studies, KCL. For speaking engagements: https://chartwellspeakers.com/speaker/shashank-joshi
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This was written before the Syrian civil war and before Israel destroyed the remnants of Syria’s air defenses. I assume a route across Syria then northern Iraq is now viable too.
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"Just as Israel’s September 2024 pager/walkie-talkie attack on Hezbollah confounded all expectations of what a war ... would look like, an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure will likely involve no small number of surprises." www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/defaul...
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Israeli air force would have three possible attack routes for a strike:
- North over Med & Turkey
- South-east, skirt Jordan & KSA, then over Iraq (Osirak route) or NE over Jordan & Iraq
- South-east & east along KSA-Iraq border to Persian Gulf, the north
diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/isra...
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Worth noting any Israeli attack could have a ground component. NYT last year: "senior Israeli officials updated their American counterparts on a plan that would have combined an Israeli commando raid on underground nuclear sites with a bombing campaign..." www.nytimes.com/2025/04/16/u...
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"Another option could be to modify an existing [nuclear capable] Jericho ICBM ... Jericho III has a 2,500lb warhead... the missile itself weighs over 60,000lb & has a range of over 4,000 miles, so swapping fuel for warhead weight could be plausible" www.jpost.com/opinion/arti...
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"Dr. Mandel's proposal of using C-130 Hercules cargo planes [to carry and deliver GBU-57] is unrealistic. While they have been used in Afghanistan, they are highly vulnerable aircraft. Short-range MANPADs can make short work of slow transports." www.jpost.com/opinion/arti...
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"Dr. Mandel's article claimed that F-15I Ra'am could theoretically undergo retrofitting to carry 30,000-pound bombs [GBU-57]. While the bomb does fit size-wise, there are several engineering roadblocks. The Ra'am would need structural modifications" www.jpost.com/opinion/arti...
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Albright: "filtration systems..you can destroy that shaft pretty deeply, that could potentially cause damage mostly through temperature effects. But you could put the facility out of commission for quite a long time...few years rather than a few months." www.iiss.org/podcasts/arm...
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Albright: "you don’t have to bring down the roof of the enrichment hall to put that facility out of operation for a long time ... And even, we were surprised by this, there’s only one ventilation shaft for [Fordow]. And you see it in the drawings."
www.iiss.org/podcasts/arm...
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David Albright "Fordow is more vulnerable than people realise. We have the building designs... Israel has even more...they know exactly how the tunnels go, where they start, how they zig and zag, where the ventilation system is, the power supplies" www.iiss.org/podcasts/arm...
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"any comparisons with Israeli attacks against Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and Syria’s Al-Kibar facility in 2007 are highly misplaced. In both instances, the attacked countries’ programmes were highly concentrated and at a nascent stage" www.rusi.org/explore-our-...
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"Strikes with lesser penetrating weapons could still collapse entry and exit tunnels...However, unless a longer-term campaign were mounted with regular follow-up strikes, efforts to dig down...to re-establish access and supplies would likely begin almost immediately."
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"For the FFEP [Fordow] and new facility at Natanz at an estimated 80-100 meters, possibly with layers of reinforced concrete, even the GBU-57/B [carried by B2/B21] would likely require multiple impacts at the same aiming point to have a good chance of penetrating the facility."
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"Our source is Safwan Bahloul, a high-ranking general in Mr Assad’s security state. He has chosen to speak out and share details of Mr Tice’s ordeal. He confirms that Mr Tice was held not by rebel groups, but rather by the Syrian state" www.economist.com/middle-east-...
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Note language. “Appears to be preparing.”
“Israel appears to be preparing to launch an attack soon on Iran, a/c to officials in the US & Europe…As of Wed, Trump’s envoy to the talks, Steve Witkoff, was still planning to attend negotiations in Oman” www.nytimes.com/2025/06/11/u...
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Diminishment of the non-US contribution in Afg always makes me think of 40 Commando Royal Marines in Sangin in 2010—a battalion that lost more men than all but a handful of US ones, including Paul Warren, who died on this floor, of a barely-platoon-sized outpost: archive.nytimes.com/atwar.blogs....
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“The network also cited two sources familiar with the phone call as saying Netanyahu did not receive a clear answer from Trump as to whether the US would give Israel a green light to act alone against Iran, or whether Washington would want to participate in or lead a strike.”
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Not in the sense of funding the entire future force as set out in the review, no.
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Read it many years ago; great book. Mostly on the war itself, right?
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The UK one? I think implications much bigger for Aus. One way or other UK is going to be building a future SSN. If it's without Aus, then probably fewer of them & at greater cost. But UK will build them come what may. Aus is in much greater trouble if deal collapses. But I doubt it will.
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The issue with AUKUS is that he thinks, per his stated views, that selling Virginias to Australia is too big a risk to take given low US production rate. So I suspect the review will look closely at that aspect
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No he is not. And the risks are higher. But I would wager that when this review is complete, it will basically say AUKUS should continue, albeit with some conditions e.g. on the annual production rate of Virginia-class submarines.
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Also an issue when it comes to the issue of potential troop withdrawals from South Korea. Given the dismantlement of the NSC and the lack of a serious process, hard to see who is driving these big changes.
bsky.app/profile/shas...
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'One person familiar with the review said it was unclear if Colby was acting alone or as part of a wider effort by Trump administration. “Sentiment seems to be that it’s the former, but the lack of clarity has confused Congress, other government departments and Australia”...'
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More budget-literate observers can correct me, but you can see here that the real boost in British defence spending happens between 2026-27 and 2027-28, when it jumps £5.5bn. Then very little increase planned for after 2027-28 (£1.5bn, then £1.7bn)
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/684917...
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Significant cuts to the Foreign Office budget (DEL) over the next several years. www.gov.uk/government/p...
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It looks as though more intel spending is being badged as defence spending too. "Recognising the key role that the intelligence agencies play...the gov't has increased the share of intelligence spending that is spent as NATO-qualifying defence expenditure" www.gov.uk/government/p...
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"The document also shows that Russia is very concerned about how China views the war in Ukraine and is trying to feed Beijing’s spies with positive information about Russian operations."
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So if the SDR reviewers were not keen on B61s (& no sign of enthusiasm for sovereign UK alternative) then it does raise the question of what they are actually getting in the section below. UK conventional participation in DCA mission, i.e. SNOWCAT? More consultation w/ allies? What am I missing?
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On UK nuclear air leg—Fiona Hill says one reason reviewers did not recommend nuclear air leg was debate in US, Congress, DoD, and "what SACEUR might think." Points to US reviewing posture. "We opted not to make any major determination." Says allies already have DCAs.
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SDR reviewers asked about nuclear air leg today by defence ctte. "We were not terribly enthusiastic about it," says Robertson. Says didn't rule it out in review but "number of practical issues". Shifts focus to "gap" in deterrence, incl long-range strike.
bsky.app/profile/shas...