This is premature. First, it reduces “great power competition” to the Biden approach to China.
But the term was only ever a euphemism encompassing a wide variety of China exclusion policies, often in tension with each other. Trump is throwing some aside but intensifying others.
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But the term was only ever a euphemism encompassing a wide variety of China exclusion policies, often in tension with each other. Trump is throwing some aside but intensifying others.
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Reposted from
Dan Nexon
Beyond the quip. I was in a discussion recently where I suggested that it was virtually impossible to reconcile what we've seen from the Trump administration with "GPC."
My interlocutor reasonably invoked Colby & the "New Asia Firsters" (drawdown in Europe, settle with Russia, focus on China).
My interlocutor reasonably invoked Colby & the "New Asia Firsters" (drawdown in Europe, settle with Russia, focus on China).
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Even if Trump genuinely wanted a stable relationship, US–China conflict won’t be left behind until there is a robust new foundation for the relationship.
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Trump is poised to seek his own imperial sphere in the Americas while offering none to China, which is a recipe for conflict.
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Trump 1 didn’t want war with Iran but was vulnerable to advisers who nearly got him there. China is not as weak.
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Biden struggled to navigate intense, incompatible demands from nationalist insecurity and imperial anxiety.
He called the balance he sought “great power competition”. It failed.
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