I wrote about UKR and nukes here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/archive/2022/02/no-ukraine-should-not-have-kept-nuclear-weapons/676415/
About conventional deterrence against small (even small nuclear) states:
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-case-conventional-deterrence-9381
About our general lack of strategy:
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/07/us-nuclear-strategy-cold-war-russia/638441/
Also, a book:
https://www.amazon.com/No-Use-National-Security-Foundation/dp/0812245660
https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/archive/2022/02/no-ukraine-should-not-have-kept-nuclear-weapons/676415/
About conventional deterrence against small (even small nuclear) states:
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-case-conventional-deterrence-9381
About our general lack of strategy:
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/07/us-nuclear-strategy-cold-war-russia/638441/
Also, a book:
https://www.amazon.com/No-Use-National-Security-Foundation/dp/0812245660
Comments
Question: Given everything that’s happened in Russia since the breakup of the USSR, plus the recent discovery that they’ve got a pretty second-rate military…what is the readiness/capability of their arsenal?
https://bsky.app/profile/allan616x.bsky.social/post/3ljdmourul22h
We did not "promise to protect".
For starters, Kazakhstan would have sold their "Soviet nukes" back in 1995.
“True peace is built on justice, accountability, and deterrence.”
https://youtu.be/CGlPAvIQJsE?...