Profile avatar
andreisterescu.bsky.social
Economist @ec.europa.eu ECFIN | Formerly @ecb.europa.eu | European 🇪🇺 and International Economic Policy | Views are my own and do not represent those of my employer
96 posts 251 followers 337 following
Prolific Poster
Conversation Starter

Tariffs won’t bring manufacturing jobs back. They might help protect existing manufacturing temporarily and re-shoring some of it, but are unlikely to reverse the structural decline in manufacturing jobs. Declining manufacturing employment is not a problem per se, but a symptom of multiple things.

🚨New paper out in @cpsjournal.bsky.social with Torben Iversen: doi.org/10.1177/0010... We empirically separate economic factors from cultural backlash as competing explanations for right-wing populism, and find evidence for the former. We define the concept of “unfunded public goods.” 🧵

“For European security, it’s Eurobonds or bust.” 💯

Good piece! The EU’s biggest economic issue right now is that its top trading partner is slamming the brakes on demand while building a tariff wall that adds to the overcapacity problem with its second biggest. Europe could be staring into a gaping hole in global demand. on.ft.com/426COoI

Kidding aside, the big difference here is that the 1930s were a Kindleberger Spiral of a global war of tariffs & competitive devaluations. This is not really the right analogy. The rest of the world isn't rejecting trade & international cooperation. It's just 🇺🇸. Brexit on steroids.

For decades, the US has been the primary source of global demand (& issuer of reserve assets) running large external deficits and debts. This proved politically unsustainable. Biden tried to reverse it via large subsidies. Trump via tariffs. Their objective is the same: reindustrialize US.

Tariffs won’t bring manufacturing jobs back. They might help protect existing manufacturing temporarily and re-shoring some of it, but are unlikely to reverse the structural decline in manufacturing jobs. Declining manufacturing employment is not a problem per se, but a symptom of multiple things.

1/14 It is hard to see much systemic thinking in the new round of tariffs, and because trade can only be resolved on a systemic basis, and not on a bilateral basis, this means that they are unlikely to be very helpful. www.nytimes.com/live/2025/04...

This looks like the result you would get if you give ChatGPT a formula and prompt 'make it more complex':

This is an insane timeline. The goods deficit-to-imports ratio with the EU was 38.9% in 2024. If we divide the $235.6bn trade deficit by the $605.8bn in total imports from the EU, that’s the ratio. Seems to apply to most countries except the ones for which the balance is roughly even.

You always hear claims that EU institutions are excessively staffed and bureaucratic, but that isn't supported by the actual employment figures. All EU institutions and agencies employ approx. 80k people to serve 449 million people. That's quite modest when compared with national administrations.

Sans y avoir énormément réfléchi à l'avance, quand l'excellent Sandro Calderon de la @rtbf.be me demande de résumer en quelques mots la situation budgétaire en France, les mots de "politique de classe" sont sortis tout seuls et avec le recul, je ne trouve tjs pas mieux www.rtbf.be/article/econ...

1/9 Dan Hannan says that free trade is an IQ test. He may well be right, but not in the way he thinks (and what is more, he would score poorly). For example, he doesn't understand the very model he cites as fundamental. @DanielJHannan www.washingtonexaminer.com/magazine-col...

The Romanian School of Government (SNSPA) has just nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize! How does @civica.bsky.social, and its members, feel about this (SNSPA is a member of CIVICA, which includes LSE, @sciencespo.bsky.social, Bocconi, @eui-eu.bsky.social etc)? snspa.ro/en/snspa-the...

To respond to Trump, China and Russia, the EU needs to make full use of its geoeconomics potential - in our @ecfr.eu policy brief @abenewman.bsky.social and I outline how the bloc can create an Economic Security Network to maximise the impact of its economic statecraft tools ecfr.eu/publication/...

They can discuss all they want. The reality is that they’ll at max speed up Hungary’s involuntary exit. Otherwise Trump implementing Project 2025 has just given a big boost to the EU.

I wrote a new piece for foreign policy. The US's postwar role as guarantor of Europe’s security is over – and may even turn adversarial. But Europe has an overlooked trump card. When it comes to manufacturing Europe blows the US out of the water. Thread. 1/ foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/07/e...

The attention economy is devouring politics. Social scientists need to understand how. As do we all. www.programmablemutter.com/p/the-attent...

Seems like a good time to re-read two Tabellini classics for those interested in German politics. www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1...

Great piece by Mehreen Khan, breaking down the economics and politics of Germany’s looming defense spending surge! www.thetimes.com/business-mon...

Die Märkte bewerten die Schuldenbremsen-Ankündigung der Koalition in spe positiv - weil sie Wachstum erwarten. Damit dass auch so kommt, sollte das Geld allerdings in zusätzliche Investitionen fließen und nicht Löcher stopfen. Die bisher bekannten Gesetzentwürfe stellen das absolut nicht sicher.

Very good piece by @catherinedevries.bsky.social on the challenge now facing Europe www.theguardian.com/commentisfre...

Why did the #CDU kill the debt brake (in all but name), and so quickly? Because it saw the inevitable failure of its incoming government under the strictures of the rules. Then Trump provided the perfect political cover.

Good on @bruegel.bsky.social & @tagliapietra.bsky.social for actually crunching the numbers to refute Trump's untrue statement - which was itself based on @creacleanair.bsky.social research which unfairly only looked at fiscal aid (which the Guardian propagated: www.theguardian.com/world/2025/f...)

My view on the debt brake reform in Bloomberg. This is the real deal. Crux is now to spend it well but Germany - being Germany - already thought about governance. www.bloomberg.com/news/article...

About that €800bn EU defence fund just announced €650bn of that - over 80% - is assuming Member States spend 1.5% of GDP more on defence over the next 4 years.* This is based on the (already announced) relaxation of the EU rules on budget deficits. But were fiscal rules ever the problem? (1/🧵)

Importantly: This is not an 800 bn euro package. This is not billions of fresh EU money. The number put out by the Commission is just the sum of assumed additional national spending under fairly hefty assumptions. The actual new EU money is just the interest rate subsidy in the new instrument. See 👇

Von der Leyen has just announced the Commission's "Rearm Europe" plan. The most important parts target national fiscal space: The Commission will activate the national escape clauses in the fiscal rules and put a new loans-based instrument on the table. Here is what it means:

We 👏 don't 👏 need 👏 another 👏 bank. 👏 We 👏 need 👏 money. 👏 This 👏 is 👏 not 👏 the 👏 same 👏 thing. Thank you for listening.

The Trump administration is putting Europe’s unity to a test. Everyone seems to agree that preserving it will be key - but what does it mean? For @sieps.bsky.social, I was asked to reflect on the concept of ‘unity’ in an essay now out: sieps.se/en/publicati...