jonasfranken.bsky.social
researching maritime critical internet infrastructure #protection and #resiliency | (pre-hype) subsea cable nerd
https://peasec.de/team/franken/
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For more information about this topics discussed in this podcast, check out these blog posts:
www.kentik.com/blog/ending-...
www.kentik.com/blog/starlin...
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10) The 🇬🇧 military is however more worried about "the ability of Russia to map, tap into or destroy military cables vital to its operations around the world. 'There are cables that are not public,' said one senior source. 'The Russians have the capability to cut military cables.'"
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We used regression analysis on global data to uncover key factors:
📈 Socio-economic (population, GDP)
🌍 Political stability & violent conflicts
🌋 Geographic situation (seismic hazards, neighbors)
Understanding these patterns can lead to a more equitable distribution of cables, enhancing resilience.
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An even better picture would be possible based on complete data. To my knowledge, the only commercially available comprehensive dataset on faults is OceanIQ‘s Cable Fault Data oceaniq.co.uk/services/cab...
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Also, there are a few available data points on repair frequency by Maintenance Zone, see for example: minz.org.nz/i/2018-chall...
Reduction to ACMA only may also lead to better results.
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Baltic is very shallow, which raises the probability of anchor drags. More telling would be: the Baltic area compared to global ocean surface with less than 400m depth — 400m being roughly the max anchor chain length in commercial shipping. Still, I would suspect significant deviation.
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Lt. Reuters spricht TWN govt von „natural deterioration“, also üblichem Verschleiß. Das kann man glauben oder nicht. ich zweifle daran, dass in TWN jemand mit der Funktion der Seekabel rechnet, so oft wie sie ausfallen. Fakt: Redundanz über Richtfunk ist ausreichend. www.reuters.com/world/asia-p...
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Das liest sich wie eine LLM-Halluzination — allemal peinlich, aber auch beunruhigend dass das so abgesegnet wurde.
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Industry explanation I’ve heard on multiple occasions: copper cables produced a different electromagnetic field that interfered intensively with electromagnetic-receptive sensory systems of sharks& rays. Once recognized, research led to better insulation of cables. Current research for power cables:
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We are also strengthening efforts to protect undersea cables, including enhanced information exchange, new detection technologies, as well as in undersea repair capabilities, and international cooperation.
At present, there is no risk to the security of electricity supply in the region. (3/3)
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Estonian press conf on submarine cable incidents bsky.app/profile/t2t2... (EN dubbed version available)
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Absolut, die mil. Kabel sind den behördl. genehmigt, und bei ihnen wäre eher anzunehmen, dass relevanter Traffic durchgelaufen ist.
Wenn „zivile“ Netze genutzt werden (wsl eher der Regelfall), wäre aber nicht nachweisbar (bzw. zumindest abstreitbar), über welches Nachbarland Daten reingekommen sind.
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It already changed, since Starlink has inter-satellite communication in its constellation since v1.5. Other sat companies also construct their constellations with this technology. So, in theory, no subsea cable would be required for (medium-latency) data transmission between US and Yemen anymore.
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Das scheitert wohl am fehlenden Beweis, dass genau der für einen Case relevante Traffic durch ein bestimmtes Kabel bzw. dessen Landestation geflossen ist.
BTW unterhält die US Navy Seekabel (>40k nm) für die US Streitkräfte, deren Positionen und Landestationen kaum öffentlich sind.