revishvili.bsky.social
Political Analyst • Former Senior Advisor at the NSC of Georgia• Focused on Russian Foreign and Security Policy • Views my own https://russiaanalyzed.substack.com
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Please don’t forget to support and subscribe to my Substack - Russia Analyzed - for the latest insights and analysis on Russian foreign and security policy and the war against Ukraine. cutt.ly/pw9h2qju
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Three years later, Ukraine stands resolute. Ukrainians have displayed extraordinary valor, courage, and resilience.
Ukraine must not be abandoned. It deserves a just and lasting peace, one that fully preserves its sovereignty.
Все буде Україна! Slava Ukraini! 🇺🇦 2/2
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They provided comprehensive insights on the war, shared assessments on its trajectory, highlighted developments in military equipment, and outlined the key challenges that Russia faces.
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Moscow's objective has always been clear: to dismantle Ukrainian statehood and establish a pro-Russian, friendly government. I don't see Russia abandoning that goal without significant pressure. 3/3
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It’s worth to remember that Russia also considers the areas of Donbas, Kherson, and Zaporizhia it does not control as its "new territories". 2/3
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I am absolutely convinced that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been, are, and will remain the most reliable guarantor of Ukraine’s security. They will always be the foundation, whether they are part of NATO or not — it is the Ukrainian Armed Forces. 8/8
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But that was completely my mistake. As of today, we see that, most likely, human resources are among the cheapest for Russia. 7/8
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I was absolutely certain that if we inflicted as many losses as possible on the Russian army and Russia, those losses would eventually force [Moscow] to abandon further actions. 6/8
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Despite the fact that by the summer of 2023, the situation on the battlefield had dramatically changed, and, by the way, the rules of warfare had evolved completely. But as of now, I would say — no. 5/8
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My answer is no (Ukraine's partners are not ready for modern warfare) I believe that, as of today, our partners are still stuck in the mindset of February 24, 2022. 4/8
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Lastly, we are unable to match the scale of human resources that Russia can mobilize, nor can we afford to pay the high price for the relatively minor victories they have achieved, all due to the combination of these three factors. 3/8
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We also cannot achieve widespread use of weapons like guided air bombs, nor can we effectively defend against them, giving Russia another advantage. 2/8
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Moscow's objective has always been clear: to dismantle Ukrainian statehood and establish a pro-Russian, friendly government.
I don't see Russia abandoning that goal without significant pressure. 2/2
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The Pavlohrad–Pokrovsk section is particularly critical, as its loss would nearly isolate Pokrovsk. 4/4
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In contrast, Ukrainian counterattacks aim to stall and wear down the Russian advance, depleting their resources while securing the Pavlohrad–Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka–Pokrovsk sections of the T0504 road. 3/4
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Instead of engaging in direct urban combat for Pokrovsk, Russian forces are attempting to bypass the city and cut off its supply lines. Their primary objective is to gain full control of key logistical routes to and from Pokrovsk, particularly the T0504 highway to the west and east of the city. 2/4
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Pictures showing the impact of the attack. 2/2
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You can find a more in-depth version on my Substack
open.substack.com/pub/russiaan...
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History has repeatedly shown that Russia respects only strength, not appeasement. Any concessions without firm deterrence will only embolden its aggression and reinforce its expansionist ambitions. 10/10
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Moscow subsequently signed several military and economic agreements with the de facto authorities of both regions. Additionally, Russia has launched a campaign aimed at securing international recognition for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 9/10
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Point 6: Launch of international discussions on security and stability arrangements for Abkhazia and South Ossetia: On August 26, 2008, Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. 8/10
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Permanent military bases were established in both Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with deployments comprising regular army troops, border guards, and FSB personnel. 7/10
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Point 5 - Russian armed forces to withdraw to the positions held before hostilities began in South Ossetia:
Russia not only violated this principle but also intensified its military presence in the occupied territories. 6/10
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Point 4 - return of Georgian armed forces to their usual quarters:
Georgian forces returned to their pre-conflict bases, resuming their positions before the outbreak of hostilities. 5/10
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Point 3 - humanitarian aid
Despite the agreement, humanitarian aid was limited to Russian-controlled routes. Russian occupation forces frequently blocked crossing points, worsening the humanitarian situation on the ground. 4/10
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Point 2 - cessation of hostilities:
After declaring a unilateral ceasefire on August 11, 2008, Georgia ceased hostilities, but Russia continued its advance, seizing Akhalgori and the Kodori Gorge. Today, Russia occupies about 20% of Georgian territory. 3/10
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Since 2008, Russian occupation forces have repeatedly killed, wounded, or illegally detained Georgian citizens near the occupation line. 2/10
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Please don’t forget to support and subscribe to my Substack - Russia Analyzed - for the latest insights and analysis on Russian foreign and security policy and the war against Ukraine. cutt.ly/pw9h2qju
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Please don’t forget to support and subscribe to my Substack - Russia Analyzed - for the latest insights and analysis on Russian foreign and security policy and the war against Ukraine. cutt.ly/pw9h2qju
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Calling Pokrovsk doomed to occupation is inaccurate. The Defense Forces still have a chance to retain control of the city, but this requires a thorough reevaluation of the entire defense strategy. 20/20
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Instead of long and deep trenches, we need to build small strongpoints, taking into account the real conditions of defensive combat. These strongpoints should be connected and located at a short distance from each other. 19/20
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When my battalion enters such a fortification, it just looks ridiculous. The people are spaced so far apart that sometimes we can't even tell how far the nearest comrade is." 18/20
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"Right now, they're building huge trenches, sometimes several kilometers long. They're built well — deep, with reinforcements, and even with cover. No questions about that. But the thing is, to hold defense in such fortifications, I need thousands of people. 17/20
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In the commander's opinion, the key problem with the fortifications is not how slowly they are being built, but that the very principle of their construction is flawed. 16/20