armscontrolwonk.bsky.social
Professor at the Middlebury Institute, member of the National Academies Committee on International Security and Arms Control, and former member of the State Department's International Security Advisory Board.
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It's only the second coolest thing Sam did this week, but we're saving that for later.
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It's really incredible how clearly one can make out the locations and interceptor types. The 39 THAAD rounds alone cost $495 million.
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Bourbon, absinthe, and aquafaba.
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We ought to judge this strike by its real purpose, not the legal camouflage of preemptive self-defense. If the strike leaves the current regime, or something very much like it, in power with a nuclear option then it will have been a strategic failure. 17/17
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This is why I said the strike is about regime change. As late as May, DIA said Iran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program. When asked about that, Rubio said the intelligence was "irrelevant." It's only irrelevant if the problem is the regime, not the program. 16/17
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RISING LION and MIDNIGHT HAMMER have not slowed the Iranian program nearly as much as the JCPOA. We hold diplomacy to much higher standards than bombing. The same people who endlessly complained about the JCPOA "sunsetting" are now happy to delay Iran's bomb by much less. 15/17
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But what does it say when two of the most amazing military operations in modern memory are still unable to fully eliminate Iran's nuclear program? I think that's proof that this is tactical brilliance may be in service of a foolhardy strategy. 14/17
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Look, I get it. Watching bombers conduct an >11,000 km precision bombing raid is awesome. I am the sort of wierdo who happily read a 528 page book about the first Black Buck raid of the Falklands War in 1982. I really do get it. 13/17
www.amazon.com/Vulcan-607-R...
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Let's say Iran decides to rush a bomb. Iran can install ~1.5 cascades a week. In six weeks, it could have 9 cascades of IR-6 machines. It would take those machines about 60 days to enrich all 400 kg to WGU. Altogether that's about five months although IMMV. 12/17
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This means Iran has retained 400 kg of 60% HEU, the ability to manufacture centrifuges, and one, possibly two underground enrichment sites. That is also to say nothing of possible secret sites, which opponents of the JCPOA used to invoke all the freaking time. 11/17
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Let me say again: Iran said it had a new enrichment facility. The IAEA was about to go see a new (empty) enrichment facility. But before that could happen, Israel struck other facilities in Iran -- but not the new one. See the problem? 10/17
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Also, Iran recently announced a "new enrichment facility in a secure location" and told the @iaeaorg.bsky.social it was ready to start installing centrifuges. The IAEA was set to inspect the facility, near Isfahan, before the bombing. It hasn't been bombed AFAIK. 9/17
www.youtube.com/watch?v=uKwv...
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In 2022, Iran moved a centrifuge production line to "the heart of the mountain" there. This facility is huge -- we estimated 10,000 m2 or more -- and we don't really know what else it might house (like enrichment or conversion). 8/17
bsky.app/profile/arms...
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IT'S NOT FINE. Yes, the strikes on the enrichment plants at Qom (Fordow FEP) and Natanz (PFEP and FEP) appear successful. But there has been no effort to strike the enormous underground facility next to Natanz where Iran can make more centrifuges and maybe do other things. 7/17
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To be fair, some Trumpkins acknowledge Iran still has the material. J.D. Vance says they're going to "have conversations with the Iranians about" it. 🙃 The talking point is that the US has knocked out Iran's ability to further enrich it and convert it to metal, so its fine. 6/17
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Trucks also showed up at the Fordow FEP the day before the strike, possibly to relocate sensitive equipment, and certainly to cover those entrances with dirt. Iran just isn't a no-drive zone at the moment. 5/17
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No one even knows where the HEU is now! IAEA DG Grossi says Iran moved it. Lil' Marco Rubio says nothing can move in Iran. But trucks are moving in Iran. Trucks and heavy equipment showed up at least two days ago to seal the tunnels to protect them. @planetlabs.bsky.social took a picture. 4/17
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The 400 kg of HEU was largely stored in underground tunnels near the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. Despite extensive Israeli and US attacks the facility, there does not seem to have been any effort to destroy these tunnels or the material that was in them. 3/17
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Netanyahu's justification for conducting this strike was that "Iran has produced enough highly enriched uranium for nine atom bombs -- nine." He refers to Iran's stockpile of ~400 kg of 60% U-235 which, if further enriched, would be enough for 9-10 weapons. Let's consider. 2/17
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It also had aquafaba, which is what you've astutely noticed.
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It was a bourbon and absinthe.
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Yes, it’s basically not contained either way.
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We don't.
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I say this because people often wrongly refer to "low-yield bunker busters" that don't exist. EPWs are high-yield weapons that produce significant fallout capable of killing tens of thousands of people. References to "tactical" nuclear weapons may reinforce that misperception.
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Depending on which way the wind is blowing and the time of day, you might kill a lot of civilians. Feel free to play around with a 300 kt surface burst at 34.88°N, 51.00°E on Alex Wellerstein's Nuke Map.
nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/?&kt...
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The same @nationalacademies.org panel also asked DTRA to estimate civilian casualties from 300 kt strikes at 3 m on three different "hypothetical" targets (🇰🇵🇱🇾🇨🇳). For comparison, Fordow is 30 km NE of Qom (1.2 million people) and 100 km SE of Tehran.
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This establishes 2 key facts: It's a 1. big but 2. shallow explosion. 1+2=LOTS of fallout because 3 m isn't enough to contain 300 kt underground. The @nationalacademies.org panel calculated that a 300 kt weapon would need to penetrate ~800 m to fully contain the explosion.
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A few meters is enough. A 300 kt weapon that burrows 3 m into the ground will impart the same energy as an 8 mt contact burst, per a @nationalacademies.org panel. Moreover, severely diminishing returns on ground shock occur ~10 m.
nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/1128...
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Why so big? Nuclear earth penetrators don't dig all the way down to the bunker. Instead, they burrow just deep enough to couple the energy from the explosion into the ground, sending a shockwave through the geology to crush the bunker.
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The late Ellen Tauscher joked that only the Bush Admin would put "robust" in front of "nuclear earth penetrator". RNEP was a study of whether a stronger or longer casing (or other limited changes) would let a B61 or the B83 survive better. The B83 has a 1 megaton yield.
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The B61-11 was tested in the frozen tundra of Alaska (🇷🇺). Bush wanted an EPW to would better penetrate rock (🇰🇵) -- the "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator." "Robust" in this context means that the nuclear weapon inside would survive the deceleration of punching into the rock.
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BTW: The official 1971 history of the B61 program was declassified thanks to @nuclearanthro.bsky.social. Please give him money if you like to documents or supporting nice people.
www.patreon.com/nuclearanthro