leoskyview.bsky.social
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Here's a bit of info I hadn't considered:
bsky.app/profile/chri...
Mediazona says 22,600 russian lawsuits opened this year for losses being faked as deserters. ~125/day not counted in any of my assessments. Obv some will be flawed suits, but also some people won't have people to file lawsuits.
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Most revenue arrived at the very end of the month, sometimes trillions in a few days. Check out Prune's May thread to see... Still, looks like a good chance there will be a monthly deficit in June.
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I agree with the skepticism! New evidence could change my opinion.
Here's a year-old post on numbers showing why I decided Ukrainian tanks claims = way higher than really destroyed numbers : groktown.substack.com/p/russian-ta...
And that's why I agree with you about the equipment losses.
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10\ Please attack any of my numbers! E.g. the prisoner estimate is the lower end of a Ukrainian claim, but seems consistent with other sources so I used it (e.g. evidence Wagner lost 20k+ KIA in about 6 months alone...). Low recruitment or high non-combat losses would also explain things.
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9\ I make that: +1.3m recruits *minimum* during the full-scale invasion. There will have been non-combat attrition of course. Maybe that's big. But if Ukraine has only inflicted, say, 500k casualties, then Russia's frontline forces should have grown by 800k. It doesn't look like that, does it?
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8\ Also there is great analysis by Janis Kluge on recruitment. Almost 500k *contract soldiers* recruited between Jan '24 and March '25. Add in 150k+ prisoners, 300k+ "partially mobilised", 100k+ Donbas Ukrainians recruited, 250k+ contract troops in 22/23...
janiskluge.substack.com/p/new-data-r...
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7\ I'm not sure what the answer is btw, this is just one analysis using what I think is really useful & credible data. If you have specific comments or other sources, please share.
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6\ Jets? Artillery? Tanks? I absolutely think Ukraine's numbers are inflated. It could be propaganda, or it could be explained by common issues in war and a bias towards reporting hits as destruction. I've read plenty of historical reports where this happened.
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5\ Need to add POW/AWOL/MIA-but-actually-dead (and maybe additional wounded associated with that). I think it more-likely-than-not that Russia's permanent losses are lower than Ukraine's statements. But including lightly wounded? Ukraine's claims seem realistic to me.
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4\ With 1:5 KIA:WIA like a modern army, then total losses might be 1.2-1.6m. I really think Russia has a worse ratio. Based on 2022 federal KIA/WIA payouts, Mediazona got 1:1.7-2.2. Combining those I get a range of about 550-840k as likely KIA + severe WIA on Russia's side.
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3\ BBC Russian estimated 195-275k KIA by June 2025. This appears to be based on *legally recognised* deaths. I have no idea what fraction of losses are not legally recognised, either because Russia is corrupt or because they genuinely wait for confirmation on MIA.
www.bbc.com/russian/arti...
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2\ A statistical estimate based on Russian probate court records put Russian losses at 165k *legally recognised dead* by end 2024. Add in 20-25k DPR/LPR, plus not-legally-recognised and 200k+ dead by December seems very reasonable.
Mediazona: en.zona.media/article/2025...
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1\ That I totally agree with. Vehicles could be hits/near misses/double counting/etc. I'm just saying I think there's a real difference: (1) claimed equipment losses are likely enormously larger than actual permanent Russian losses. (2) claimed "liquidated" personnel could be in the ballpark.
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2\ and I estimated that Ukraine's claims of *casualties* are credible but probably include lightly wounded. But still on the upper end of what's likely. I strongly think their claims of tanks, IFVs, artillery are way too high for destroyed. Maybe they're ones they hit or got near?
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1\ I don't think Andrew is counting all losses, just from published drone videos, and I've also heard strong claims of way below 1:5 ratio (e.g. iirc 47th Brigade and Madyar monthly summaries?). The thread I linked uses mediazona inheritance court data too... Which is more complete and above Poteru.
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I agree Ukraine's claims surely can't be destroyed vehicles. But... Their claimed russian casualties correlate really well with obituary counts. bsky.app/profile/leos... so IMO good for judging more/less intensity.
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Thank you! There's tons of confusing info and you're the best source I found. People push their opinions confusing "allocated", "spent", ignoring "multilateral" etc. Rough estimate (wide range is fine): what's your guess ar the change in military aid this year Vs last ?
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At some point could you do a comparison of total aid from Germany to Ukraine 2024 Vs 2025? This number is smaller than what I thought I remembered for last year (€11bn?)
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4\ Also I didn't properly account for the "fiscal rule" on oil revenues, which might matter. More work to do. I'll look into that after the June results are in.
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3\ Russia might cut interest rates, get better deals on bonds, see rising oil prices, or their tax hikes could hit later. I don't know if they'll save their budget, I just know that the data so far and the 2023/24 patterns look like a 7.6tr deficit.
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2\ Spending is weighted to second half of year, non-finance costs added ~0.7tr over Jun-Dec in 2024. If repeated, then their "normal spending" deficit would end around 1.6r rub. 2025 finance costs (bonds + loan/mortgage subsidies) est at ~6tr rub. Combine them for 7.6tr.
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I don't understand. Trump and republicans have cut off new aid packages. Tens of billions less military aid is in Ukraine's hands, Putin has been rewarded and dragged out the war now republicans saved his army. Surely Trump has been Putin's most important foreign ally?
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Finance costs so far: ~2tr in OFZ discounts+coupons. 1-1.5tr in mortgage/loan subsidies. Estimated "real stuff" deficit is 0.8-1.6tr. Range depends on whether coupon taxes have been paid already or will be later.
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Thanks for sharing graphs and tables and please keep it up. This is a really good thread 👏
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Take care of yourself Jakub. We'd rather wait a night than have you burn out forever. 🤝
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Would be really interesting to hear your description & interpretation of other major income streams. Russia's other income did increase v April 2024... Is that a one off or did they find a new source to drain for a bit?
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Nice find! What do you mean "cut from budget"? That looks like they're withdrawing it from some other account to me.
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Related: ~100bn rub (~$1-1.25bn) revenue in 2023. 15k employees now after firing 2k in March. www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/05/16/f...
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Slow spending month so far.
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Thanks for posting these clear numbers!
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Do you mean you think they're booked in the year they're auctioned? I assumed that, but they *could* amortise. E.g. discount of 10bn on a 10-year bond = booking 1bn expenses each year? Or 10bn in auction year? It's not a big deal either way but bugs me that I don't know.
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So we think the auction discounts are booked as expenses. Do you have any idea if they're booked in the auction year, or amortised over the bond lifetime? Current results suggest ~0.8tr in discounts this year which is starting to matter.
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6th June. For future reference: Prune's added the dates to the OFZ graphic and now pinned the threads to her profile.
bsky.app/profile/prun...
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TBF a lot of the "hidden" stuff is military orders & some could be "front loading". However, Russia said the same in 2023. By April '23 they'd spent 33% of total. Russia is claiming ~37% so far this year... Would be unprecedented front loading. I think they're maybe not being 100% honest.
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5\ Are business subsidies likely to be more or less expensive than mortgages per rouble outstanding? If they're equally as expensive then that implies total (mortgage+other) costs of ~2tr in 2024 and ~3.2tr in 2025. If subsidised rate is 15% then it'd be 1.6->2.7tr instead. Hence my interest!
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4\ I assumed just the interest is paid off by borrowers. For 20+yr mortgage the principal payments should be smallish, but including them would inflate my 2024 estimate. I already assumed small markups in 2024 to get close to Siluanov. Still, this is the best I can do.
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3\ Here's an example cost estimate. Need to assume markups, subsidised rates etc. I can fiddle the numbers to get pretty close to Siluanov's 1.2tr and 2.0tr claims
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2\ Here's a rough way of estimating volume combining different sources (which don't quite agree on outstanding total amounts but whatever). I set the March 2024 amount to 10.1tr and then for past months just subtract new issuance reported by CBR dashboard (see comment in pt4)
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1\ Here are some mortgage only results. I'm trying to reproduce Siluanov's stated mortgage-only costs, of 1.2tr in 2024 and on course for 2.0tr in 2025. These are only estimates, I know I will be off by some amount.
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Thanks once again. I have tried to make all of Siluanov's statements + your source match and I just can't quite do it. I'm close but not there. Range of predicted costs for loan subsidies in 2025, inc. mortgages, ranges from 2-4tr or so at current rates.
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Ok reading that can you confirm my understanding: so far O&G has contributed 4157-3676=481bn to the NWF. The amended plan says it will end at 8317-8765=-448bn. So the "official plan" (for now) is net withdrawals of 929bn rub from the NWF in the rest of 2025 for the federal budget alone?
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Nice graph! Consistent with their data which said they were on track to ~7tr deficit in **February**. I will look for updated results through April data.
bsky.app/profile/leos...
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Any idea what the subsidised&unsubsidised rates are for the outstanding other loans (private/SME)? I have the volume outstanding for those at least.
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Thank you again Stanimir! That's very helpful. Looks like the outstanding amount is lower (10.1tr) but the subsidies seem to be calc'd to market rate rather than CBR rate? Would explain Siluanov's claim of 2tr annual costs.
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Most taxes arrive at end of month. Looks like last days were +3051bn revenue and +555bn expenses?