africatakes.bsky.social
Just an intelligence analyst looking for a space to air his opinions on developments in Africa without implicating his employer.
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This is such a key window into the breakdown in morale and discipline following the fall of Bukavu. Fights with allies trying to acquire the arms they need to resist the M23. At this point it seems the only thing that might slow the M23 down is overstretch.
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expires the current allegations and rumours of corruption will transform into legal charges. So quietly agitating and mobilising for greater power might be too tempting to resist. However, if he is unsuccessful, the next time we see tanks in Harare, they won’t be for display.
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Chiwenga likely suspects that tanks in the streets of Harare will sufficiently evoke memories of Mugabe’s fall that Mnangagwa will get the picture about where power really lies. But will he? Mnangagwa still has allies and he will likely be concerned that when his term
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It’s possible that this attempt to placate his critics has been interpreted as a recognition of his vulnerability, and so Chiwenga has used his influence in the military to demonstrate to Mnangagwa very clearly, the consequences of trying to extend his power again.
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This resistance has been sufficient to force Mnangagwa to publicly state that he won’t extend his term. However there was little confidence he would commit to this promise and many suspected he would continue to covertly use his allies to push for an extension.
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patience is running out with Mnangagwa, particularly from his vice president Constantino Chiwenga (he was instrumental in removing Mugabe and likely wants to secure the presidency himself at some point), the army and ZANU-PF veterans.
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Mnangagwa and his allies have over recent month been ramping up efforts to generate popular support for the president to extend his term until 2030. However, after two terms of sustained economic mismanagement and limited progress in getting western states to drop sanctions,
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Unfortunately we are likely to see repeats of the scenes in Goma, a spike in ethnically directed violence and further displacement. Although with Goma and Bukavu there are few centres with sufficient resources to support the displaced.
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Are you sure that is what the DRC agreed? They agreed to resume negotiations with armed groups through a previous process that I believe excluded the M23. But if they have agreed to negotiations with M23 that is indeed a major concession.
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I am less convinced of this. I don’t think Rwanda believes it is realistic that it can hold Goma indefinitely, but it likely hopes that it can get the DRC to drop any claims to possible oil deposits in Lake Kivu, they also probably want political and economics concessions to M23 leadership
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Whoever took charge would face immediate and substantial challenges and possibly new open rebellion, particularly in Kasai, but it’s certainly a risk to watch out for.
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(This threat will be highest for the embassies of western and African seemed to back Rwanda, the US, France, Kenya).
- a likely deterioration in the military’s confidence in Tshisekedi. I don’t think this makes a coup inevitable.
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Either escalations are unlikely to prove decisive in the short term and would likely only worsen and drag out the conflict.
Regardless, for now the immediate concerns are:
- A likely renewed spike in protests targeting international embassies in Kinshasa.
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It could also include relying increasingly on foreign powers for military support. There is a significant risk of Burundi getting much more involved in the conflict, reports suggest Tshisekedi was recently seeking Angolan military support.
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This could include a mass nationwide mobilisation (such as seen in Ethiopia during the TPLFs push to Addis), which would likely risk substantially escalating intercommunal violence and have long term implications for national stability (how do you manage a surge in armed men).
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It is highly unlikely that Congo has the military capacity to retake its territory. So it must either concede to Kagame’s demand to directly negotiate with and offer concessions to the M23 (rather humiliating) or find new ways to escalate.
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Despite talk of a counter offensive and the stated intention to continue fighting by numerous senior personnel, this does not yet appear to have been followed up with significant action. No substantial new troop deployments/ efforts to improve the army’s morale/ new equipment.
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(all of which appears unlikely) then ultimately the DRC will need to negotiate with the M23 to resolve the conflict. Until then Kagame’s forces will likely continue to make incremental gains in the eastern DRC.
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so they should not be legitimised, makes sense and is a defence against making concessions directly to the group. However, unless the military calculus changes significantly (greater deployment by the SADC, major mobilisation of Congolese) or sanctions on Rwanda,
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The omission of this detail, from a publication friendly to the Congolese state suggests that this is currently something Congolese authorities are not yet ready to commit to. This is understandable, the argument that the M23 are simply a vehicle for Rwandan interests
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This will give the MK and EFF the opportunity they need to expand. So, if you are a white American opposed to South African policies towards white people, then attacks on the current government are likely counterproductive. The alternative is not better.
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Their claim has been that this Government of Nation Unity (which includes the DA) cannot provide for South Africans and is only interested in enriching business. Unless unemployment rates drop and conditions improve, confidence in the ANC and its partners will decline.
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If Trump’s cuts to aid over this issue undermine the South African economy and drive anti government sentiment, the beneficiaries will not be the largely white Democratic Alliance, it will be more radical groups like the MK and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).
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So what is Trump’s, Elon’s and their acolytes response to this compromise position. To chastise it as radical and to lump the current government in with real radicals. This is a mistake.
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It can only be used in certain instances, it has to be a last resort after tough negotiation and it can be challenged in the courts. In other words it is time consuming and expensive for the state.
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Ramaphosa has consistently highlighted the need to attract foreign investment and so clearly came at this policy with a degree of reluctance and that is reflected in the policy as it currently exists. A policy that is designed to be unwieldy and to discourage its use.
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A version of this idea was not unpopular in South Africa, where white South Africans (about 8% of the population) own about 75% of all land. If you are honest it’s not surprising as to why. So the ANC needed to have answer for this demand and so moved towards expropriation.
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Mngxitama and figures like him have wanted a much more radical version of expropriation without compensation. More like Zimbabwe, they argued for the nationalisation of land and redistribution of white owned property.
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The man in the video is Andile Mngxitama and while he is indeed in parliament, to describe him as one of the people “running South Africa” is a stretch. He is a member of uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) an opposition party that has been undercutting support for the ANC from the left.
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This commentary really underlines the sheer ignorance of the recent debate about the land expropriation issue and of recent US policy addressing it.
Allow me a moment to explain just how backwards this is, and the policy it seeks to defend.
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This policy is a mistake and will likely do little other than weaken US influence in South Africa, while undermining one of South Africa’s more pro business and reform minded governments in recent decades.
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Certainly a process to watch closely over the coming months, particularly given the disquiet from Northern states concerned that an insufficient amount of revenues generated from VAT will be accessible to them.
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But if the government is unlucky, and the measures are rolled out as there is a spike in global prices on oil or food, there is a possibility that these reforms will become a flashpoint for protests.
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Possibly the state clampdown following last year’s unrest will be sufficient to discourage high levels of unrest and provided the measures succeed in bringing down spending on some key expenses the government will possibly get away without too great a public reaction.
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This comes at a time of high levels of anxiety over cost of living, reflected in last years protests across Nigeria, the removal of popular subsidies, high levels of inflation and an ongoing increase in telecom tariffs.
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While the government has said that removing VAT from some key goods will reduce costs for most consumers, greater focus on tax compliance will likely result in citizens paying more while greater VAT costs on other business spending will likely prompt them to increase prices.
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However, there will be significant challenges to doing so and given the back and forth we have witnessed on removing oil subsidies, it’s likely that fear of exacerbating cost of living challenges and prompting public backlash will undercut the rollout of reform.
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Reform to address this challenge feels necessary. The government needs to more effectively monetise the broad array of economic activity taking place across the country so that it can effectively reinvest; reducing dependence on nervous foreign investors and global oil prices.
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Such a move would likely be perceived as evidence that Rwanda poses a direct threat to Burundi’s national security, increasing tensions along the Rwanda-Burundi border and the risk of the conflict zone expanding beyond the DRC.
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If Burundian forces substantially escalate pressure on the M23, Rwanda will likely seek to increase the capabilities of the Red Tabara group (Burundian rebels) to distract Burundian forces.
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Tensions between Rwanda and Burundi have been elevated for years, with both states accusing the other of funding and arming their respective opposition rebel groups. Direct conflict between the Rwandan and Burundian forces will likely exacerbate this dynamic.
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And when they have run out of people to blame, it’s likely that they will point to each other, and what functionality AES has, will disintegrate. Leaving these states alone, except perhaps for Russia, standing by with the next shipment of Kalashnikovs.