matejrisko.bsky.social
Researcher, focus on Nukes | Missiles | Deterrence | Strategy & Planning | War & International Security | Air Power | Wargames | Strictly personal views, Usual Cavetas
Igitur qui desiderat pacem praeparet bellum
500 posts
1,021 followers
953 following
Regular Contributor
Active Commenter
comment in response to
post
There are many types of these FPV interceptors - from ~5k to 25k (Shaheds are 20-50k),so the ratio itself favours interceptors but otherwise it's a comparison that doesn't make much sense.The cost-effectiveness relates to the damage caused by the strike packages (consisting of OWA-UAVs, CMs and BMs)
comment in response to
post
Advance warning is nice, but it is usually done to allow the opposing side to move more AD/ABM systems and to prepare the defended area for a strike.
comment in response to
post
Yes, German’s reluctance towards Ukraine’s NATO membership and Merkel’s eastern policy in general (including North Stream) were a real problems that pawed the way for this crisis
comment in response to
post
They definitely are.
comment in response to
post
The Soroka Hospital strike was almost certainly not intentional, but that doesn't excuse it. When you send a missile with a CEP of 1.2-1.5km against a target, you're expecting it to hit absolutely anywhere. When you fire it at a population centre it is intentional terror bombing.
2/2
comment in response to
post
Iran's problem is that it has lost its conventional deterrent-Syria is free and the axis of resistance through which it projected its power does not exist anymore. Without modern AD assets and airpower,your rudimentary LRS capability won't help (at this distance)
www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
comment in response to
post
Yes and no.
States rely on conventional deterrence because of this vulnerability to bridge the time to build the bomb. Kennedy considered attacking PRC,but was deterred by the prospect of retaliation against US allies.Clinton considered striking DPRK,but it would unleash a war on the peninsula
1/2
comment in response to
post
It is by the way a textbook example of offensive neorealism.
To be clear- the US probably can force/coerce Israel to accept the deal. No one else, but Trump is very weak (speaking about foreign policy) so….
Rigorously (ICD203), there’s 55-80% chance of US joining the war (likely/probable)
FIN
4/4
comment in response to
post
And if Iran with modernised modern military, decides to withdraw from the NPT and build a bomb it won't be that easy to destroy it-its conventional deterrence will be much more credible. Therefore, Israel is demanding regime change and is unlikely to agree to the nuclear deal.
3/4
comment in response to
post
…even if that is perhaps just obligatory rhetoric. For Israel, given its lack of strategic depth and history and, it is a potential existential threat. Survival of the Iranian regime means it will become stronger over time (to prevent another such situation).
2/4
comment in response to
post
Prussians btw knew this. They in fact often played it for fun after or during military exercises. And Kriegsspiel had very strictly defined rules that translated into the real operations. This aspect almost disappeared, now it is mostly about education.
comment in response to
post
…and It will have exactly the opposite effect on the main strategic objective of the operation (regime change) I generally sympathise.
They will legitimise IRGC in the eyes of those who have opposed them till now.
2/2
comment in response to
post
All domain warfare and air power bros we might be so back.
comment in response to
post
Interesting, is the source trustworthy? The other points stands however, this is possible only via L-16 protocol.
comment in response to
post
AFAIK Ukraine directly asked for it but the possible modernisation has likely (idk for sure) been terminated by the new admin as have many other things. But it was definitely a priority (again not an easy task in any case).
comment in response to
post
It would require some additional modifications, also in the airframe (radome dimension constraints and others*), it's not -that- easy to integrate APG-68, but it should have been done, there was enough time for it, MLUs are basically something like block 15s back in the days.
comment in response to
post
This means
1) AEW&C was on station
2) Ukrainian aircraft now operate CSI & L-16
3) Ukraine now has a (*limited*) ability to deny Russian air operations
4) deconflict is now much easier
Pretty big news to be quite honest.
FIN
4/4
comment in response to
post
This shoot down is notable in that the F-16MLU was able to (presumably at long range) ambush a Russian CAP aircraft (the APG-66 is just horrible and virtually useless for BVR combat).
So in my view the use of an AEW&C aircraft *is* likely
3/4
comment in response to
post
….on 30.5.2025 Deputy Minister of Defence for Dgital Development Chernohorenko confirmed that Ukraine signed an agreement to use CSI, so it seems that the aircraft are already equipped with it.
2/4
comment in response to
post
Hence the discrepancies in dates (not really discrepancies).
I mean there’s a reason why NATO changed the code name of the missile from SSC-X-8 to SSC-8 at one point.
comment in response to
post
That’s what I meant by last sentence tbh. It will take time, but it may mean the faster attrition rate. But IMHO it won’t substantially influence the offensive operations against Ukraine anyway.
comment in response to
post
It will have little impact on Russia's offensive operations against Ukraine in the short and medium term, as these are contingent on the availability (production) of standoff munitions. A greater flight time may have an impact on the fleet in the long term however.
FIN
3/3
comment in response to
post
However, the losses have fundamentally affected/ will affect the conventional strike/contingency planning for the war with NATO, esp if we talking about first echelon forces.
2/3