samagreene.bsky.social
Director of Democratic Resilience, CEPA.
Professor of Russian Politics, King's College London.
Political sociologist. Progressive. Co-author, Putin v the People. š¬š§/šŗšø
199 posts
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471 following
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Tired of winning yet?
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It would appear more that Trumpās America is interested in projecting military power, but doing so in a way that is transactional and unencumbered by alliances and other durable obligations.
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Il'y a donc un dicton amĆ©ricain au sujet des dindes, qui votent pour Thanksgiving. Le problĆØme est que chaque dinde est sĆ»re qu'elle s'Ć©chappera de l'assiette. En rĆ©alitĆ©, chaque dinde vote pour que les autres soient le dĆ®ner.
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Š¢Š°Šŗ?
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Š”ŠøŠ»Š° Š² ŠæŃŠ°Š²Š“Šµ, Š±ŃŠ°Ńā¦
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We protest not the intolerant, but their intolerance. We deplore not the hater, but their hatred. And we have the courage of our convictions. Lord knows, they have the courage of theirs.
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Wishing I spoke German!
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PS -- All of the above, like everything else I post on this site, represents my own opinions and analysis, and not those of any particular institution.
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Victoria Nuland, if I recall, had some choice words for Brussels when the EU dithered in 2014. Now might be the time for Europe to return the sentiment.
/END
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Washington, likely, wonāt be happy, but if Trump intends for America to depart the field, he will have to contend with the fact that he has ceded power to those with greater resolve and proximity.
/27
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There is not a lot of time to figure this out, but because talks between Washington and Moscow will inevitably drag on, there is some. The first step is to stop waiting for DC. If European powers are certain that they want a secure and sovereign Ukraine, they can act to make that happen.
/26
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Europe and Kyiv thus have the opportunity to force their terms on Moscow and Washington, by designing and deploying a force that would create genuine deterrence against further Russian aggression.
/25
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The reality Putin wants us to ignore is this: Neither Russia nor the US can set the terms on which European troops enter Ukraine, or even whether they enter Ukraine. That is a sovereign decision by the Ukrainians and the Europeans.
/24
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But Putin is also betting that the Europeans and the Ukrainians will be shell-shocked into abandoning their own agency in all of this. Thatās where Putin ought to be wrong.
/23
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Putin, then, is betting that by enticing Trump to the table, he will be able to keep him there long enough to entrench Russiaās advantage on the battlefield and to push the Europeans into disengagement, after which he can get the deal he really wants. He may be right.
/22
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Indeed, this might be a good time to re-up this thread from December 2023:
x.com/samagreene/s...
/21
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What Putin does want, however, is to lock the US into a lengthy political process that will (a) disincentivize providing further support for Ukraine, and (b) provide a smorgasbord of opportunities to extract interim concessions, all while leaving Russia free to keep fighting.
/20
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Which brings me to the key point in all of this: Putin isnāt interested in a rapid end to the war. His economy and political legitimacy are built on this war, and on conflict with the West more broadly. Pivoting away from that would be costly.
/19
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The problem here for Trump is that heās not in a position to give Putin what he wants, even if heās minded to. No decision made in the White House will be binding on Europe, or even on the next US administration. And Putin knows that, too.
/18
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Remember, at the end of this day, this war isnāt about NATO. Itās about Europe:
tldrussia.substack.com/p/heres-look...
/17
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The White House, by contrast, takes a minimalist approach, simply wanting the fighting to stop. While the administration has already signaled a veto of Ukraineās NATO accession, that in and of itself is unlikely to satisfy Putin. He will want a break on EU accession, too.
/16
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Finally, the Kremlin is insisting on talks that would address the āunderlying causesā of the war, by which it almost certainly means not the imperialist and autocratic nature of Putinās regime, but Europeās failure to acquiesce to a Yalta-esque re-division of the continent.
/15
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Trump, meanwhile, has been unusually consistent on the necessity of having European peacekeepers in Ukraine, which creates a problem for Putin. He needs a deal that ensures him of facing no consequence when (not if) he violates it. He doesnāt need the prospect of war with Europe.
/14
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Putin will want sanctions relief on finance, where Trump may well deal, but mostly on hydrocarbons, where he wonāt. POTUS is committed to maintaining high enough oil prices to incentivize investment in US fields, and to keeping Russian gas out of Europe, in order to sell US LNG.
/13
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Keeping Ukraine out of NATO might be the one area where Trump can easily sign on. Although SecDef has partially walked back his āno-NATOā statement, Trump himself has been reasonably clear on the topic, and this is one chip Iād expect to see him bargain away rather quickly. But itās not enough.
/12
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For Putin, an acceptable deal would need to do four things:
1. Keep Ukraine out of NATO
2. Provide sanctions relief
3. Leave Russia in control of escalation
4. Neuter Europe
/11
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First, despite Trump's evident post-Putin-call ebullience, Washington and Moscow remain miles apart on what even a minimally acceptable settlement would entail. Perhaps that's why Moscow's read-out of the call was considerably less enthusiastic.
/10
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But all of that said, the idea that Trump and Putin are hours or days away from imposing a settlement on Ukraine and Europe is fantastical. Yes, the sky is considerably closer to the ground than it was three weeks ago, but it hasn't fallen yet, and there is time to act.
/9
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The bait-and-switch, with Kellogg talking to the Ukrainians and Europeans, but Witkoff dealing with Moscow and evidently Trump, does more than just underscore the White House's preference for bilateralism. It locks in the sense in Europe that Washington cannot be trusted.
/8
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Low-light 3: By sidelining Kellogg the White House has pulled the rug out from under European efforts to build bridges to the new administration and to find ways to cooperate on shaping an outcome in Ukraine that would provide for durable European security.
/7
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This is just ... dumb. There may be good reasons to avoid extending an explicit Article 5 guarantee to NATO-member forces operating in Ukraine. But communicating to Putin the absolute absence of any such guarantee gives away the game before talks even start.
/6
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Low-light 2: After insisting that Europe would have go it alone on a peacekeeping force in Ukraine, SecDef Hegseth announced that such a force would have to operate without cover from NATO's Article 5.
/5
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Let's leave aside the fact that is incompatible with Trump's insistence that Europe take more responsibility for its own security. A bilateral approach effectively enlists Trump in Putin's effort to dictate the terms of Europe's own defense.
/4